Trumping Mexico’s Sovereignty?: On a potential US extension of the “War on Terror” to a “War on Cartels” by Bliecke, Vanessa & Diekjobst, Rouven
Trumping Mexico’s Sovereignty?
On a potential US extension of the “War on Terror”
to a “War on Cartels”
Rouven Diekjobst, Vanessa Bliecke 2019-12-20T09:10:43
President Trump reportedly planned to label Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist
organizations, stating that the US considered to “go in and clear out”. The Mexican
response was quick to follow, expressing concerns about a possible US intervention
and the concomitant threat to Mexico’s sovereignty. Although President Trump
has temporarily halted such designation in the face of Mexican protests (see here),
questions remain: What (if any) consequences does the designation as a terrorist
organization have under international law and what options does the legal framework
provide to combat international terrorism without infringing upon state sovereignty?
Importantly, labelling Mexican drug cartels as terrorist organizations would be a
matter of US national law. Consequences under international law would only arise,
if the international community followed the US in their designation. According to
the customary definition (see here, para. 85), international terrorism consists  of
criminal acts including transnational elements intended to create a state of terror in
the general public or coerce an authority to do or refrain from doing something. The
Mexican drug cartels are responsible for widespread and organized criminal activity
and organized crime related killings in Mexico have cost roughly 150,000 lives since
2006 (see here, at p. 3). Although the UN Security Council (UN SC) stated in its
recent Resolution 2482 that organized crime and terrorism are often linked, they are
not equal. In case of the Mexican drug cartels the intent to cause a state of terror as
well as the transnational element are doubtful, so that their terrorist status is at least
not evident. Be that as it may, the purpose of this piece is not to undertake a precise
legal classification of the cartels, but rather to assume, arguendo, terrorist status in
order to examine what consequences this entails under international law.
Generally, Art. 2(4) UN Charter prohibits the use of force in the international relations
of a state. As a matter of their sovereignty, states are, naturally, free to consent to
the use of force on their territory against terrorists. The USA and Mexico already
cooperate in the field of security and the fight against organized crime through
various initiatives (e.g.  the Merida Initiative of 2008). However, since this spring,
Mexico has contemplated ending the cooperation and the Mexican government’s
reactions to Trump’s statements make it unlikely that it would consent to a military
intervention by the USA on its territory. In this context, a use of force of the USA
against the cartels would require justification.
Art. 51 UN Charter provides the right to use force in self-defence for the victim of
an armed attack. No major problem arises, where the conduct of armed groups (in
this case the cartels) is attributable to a state. In this regard, the ICJ’s Nicaragua
(para. 115) and Genocide (paras. 398 et seq.) judgments provide guidance: the court
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held that the conduct of armed groups can be attributed, where the state exercises
effective control over the group. However, despite cartel infiltration of government
(see here, at p. 17), Mexico overall rather combats than supports the cartels, so
that the state is not connected in such a close way to the cartels that would justify
attributing the latter’s conduct to Mexico.
This leads to the more interesting question, whether the US would be allowed to
use force against the cartels under the premise that their actions are not attributable
to Mexico. Given the context of Art. 51 in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is
concerned with international peace, i.e. the peace between states, it appears that
Art. 51 solely aims to cover armed attacks conducted by a state (also held by the
ICJ in its Wall Advisory Opinion, para. 139). In line with this, where states attempted
to invoke Art. 51 against non-state actors (e.g. Israel or South Africa) this was not
well received by the international community. The UN SC, for instance, reliably
rejected such understanding of Art. 51 in the last century (e.g. in Res. 568 and 573).
Noteworthy though, its practice seems to have changed since the attacks of 9/11. In
their aftermath, the UN SC has frequently expressed that its authority is not limited
to interstate conflicts, but also encompasses conflicts between states and non-
state actors and, importantly, has repeatedly stated that acts of terrorism constitute
a “threat to the peace” in terms of Art. 39 UN Charter, making reference to self-
defence in this regard (Res. 1373, 1368 and 1438). While these resolutions show
that the UN SC can take action against terrorists and specify the obligation of states
not to support terrorism, they neither explicitly nor implicitly authorize the use of force
against terrorists. However, the UN SC’s recognition of the relevance of terrorism to
Chapter VII of the UN Charter shows that the abovementioned contextual argument
might not be the last word on the subject. This is all the more important since states
increasingly often rely on Art. 51 to justify the extraterritorial use of force against non-
state actors (e.g. the international intervention against ISIS or Turkey’s operation
Peace Spring in Syria).
To circumvent missing consent and the demanding criteria of attributing the conduct
of non-state actors to states, two doctrines have gained importance over the last
two decades. First, the safe-haven doctrine on the intentional harboring of terrorists
within a State, initially used when the USA invoked Art. 51 to justify its attacks on the
Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. While the doctrine’s legal recognition remains
controversial, there is certainly no room for its application in this case, since Mexico
has constantly been fighting the cartels and does not grant them a place of retreat
or any other form of protection. Second, more recently, states have claimed that
the territorial state had to tolerate self-defence measures, if it was itself unwilling
or unable to prevent terrorist groups from cross-border attacks (the international
intervention against ISIS being the most prominent example). As can be seen from
Mexico’s own efforts, it is clearly not unwilling to combat the cartels. However, in
view of the scale and duration of their criminal activities, Mexico’s ability to do so can
be reasonably questioned.
Given this inability, would a US intervention be justified based on the unwilling or
unable doctrine? Notably, this doctrine has been the subject of criticism, especially
after the operations against ISIS in Syria. In particular, the Latin American states
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(ironically, above all Mexico itself) lambasted the application of this extensive
standard and expressed their concern that this reading of Art. 51 would lead to
violations of their sovereignty. Moreover, no state practice or opinion juris to support
this doctrine can be drawn from Turkey’s invocation of Art. 51 to justify its military
operation against non-state actors in Syria: Turkey did not specify on which grounds
it invoked Art. 51 against non-state actors and, additionally, the international
community clearly expressed its conviction of the illegality of Turkey’s operation. It is
specifically these critical reactions against an extensive reading of Art. 51, coupled
with the silence of the majority of UN member states on this issue, which illustrate
that self-defence against non-state actors is not (yet) accepted under Art. 51.
Hence, the Mexican cartels already do not qualify as perpetrators of an armed
attack in terms of Art. 51. However, assuming that self-defence could in principle
be exercised against non-state actors, is the threshold of an armed attack even
met? The recent (verbal) encounter between Mexico and the US was triggered
by a Cartel ambushing and killing nine persons of dual US-Mexican citizenship in
Northern Mexico, which would in and of itself clearly not suffice. Although much
more large-scale attacks have occurred, they have been directed against Mexico
and its citizens, not against the US. Moreover, Art. 51 would require the attack to
be imminent, which does not cover acts of preventive self-defence. Instead, the
Caroline-threshold (“instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation”) remains decisive in determining the imminence of the
armed attack – a criterion that is hard to establish considering the rather vague
threat emanating from the cartels towards the US.
In conclusion, Mexico’s consent concerning a US extraterritorial intervention against
Mexican cartels, terrorists or not, remains indispensable.
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